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Abstract 
 
After the death of Osama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda showed a transformation from a centralized and 
hierarchical movement to a local and decentralized with a conflict of competition between leaders 
that is inseparable from the strategy of the death of the central leader and the rise of the ISIS group 
globally. The question to be answered in this article is how is the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda 
movement after the death of Osama Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration in Iraq and Syria. The 
methodology used is a literature review of various references, which still rarely discusses the new 
orientation of Al-Qaeda after the death of Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration. The conclusion 
obtained in the article is that the new direction from global to local is inseparable from a temporary 
strategy to distance itself from the anti-terrorism campaign carried out by the United States to 
combat ISIS groups in Iraq and Syria. The plan of Al-Qaeda, which tends not to be aggressive, is 
inseparable from internal consolidation and the formation of new networks at the local level, 
especially in Syria. 
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Abstrak 
 
Setelah kematian Osama Bin Laden gerakan Al-Qaeda menunjukkan transformasi dari gerakan 
hierarkis yang terpusat menjadi gerakan lokal dan terdesentralisasi dengan konflik persaingan 
antara pemimpin yang tidak terlepas dari strategi atas kematian pemimpin utama dan kebangkitan 
kelompok ISIS secara global. Pertanyaan yang hendak dijawab dalam artikel ini adalah bagaimana 
orientasi baru gerakan Al-Qaeda pasca wafatnya Osama Bin Laden dan deklarasi ISIS di Irak dan 
Suriah. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah dengan kajian pustaka atas berbagai referensi yang 
masih jarang membahas soal orientasi baru Al-Qaeda pasca kematian Bin Laden dan deklarasi 
ISIS. Kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah bahwa orientasi baru dari global ke lokal tidak terlepas 
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dari strategi sementara untuk menjauhkan diri dari kampanye anti-terorisme yang diusung oleh 
Amerika Serikat yang berfokus untuk memerangi kelompok ISIS di Irak dan Suriah. Strategi yang 
cenderung untuk tidak agresif tersebut tidak terlepas dari konsolidasi internal dan pembentukan 
jaringan baru di tingkat lokal, terutama di Suriah.  
 
Keywords: Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, orientasi baru gerakan 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The hijacking of the aircraft crashed into the twin tower, World Trade Center (WTC), in New York 
City, it destroyed parts of the Pentagon building at the U.S. Department of Defense in Arlington, 
making the name Al-Qaeda globally known as the main actor behind the action. The horrific day 
of 9/11, which then sparked a war on terror campaigns followed by sending U.S. troops and 
coalition forces to the Middle East. The desire of the Americans for vicarious revenge (Gollwitzer 
et al., 2014) to kill Osama Bin Laden in a raid, rather than died in an airplane crash eventually 
develops in search of the Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan to Pakistan. The death of Osama Bin Laden 
made this organization not much active, especially followed by the declaration of the establishment 
of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014. Since then, the Al-Qaeda movement looks not 
so aggressive but still maintains and builds its campaign. 
The critical question raised in this paper is, what is the orientation of the Al-Qaeda after the 
death of Osama Bin Laden and the ISIS declaration in Iraq and Syria? This question gap of studies 
related to Al-Qaeda among researchers who did not discuss the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda 
movement after Osama bin Laden and the ISIS declaration in Iraq and Syria. Mohamedou’s study 
(2011), for example, discusses the mutation of the Al-Qaeda from ”centralized and hierarchical 
groups” towards the movement of ”regional and decentralized organizations” with several 
competing leaders after the death of Bin Laden in May 2011. The study got an interesting opening 
point related to how Al-Qaeda's new orientation after Osama bin Laden’s death in dynamics 
regionally, especially in Syria. 
A study about Al-Qaeda’s new orientation after the death of Osma Bin Laden shows some 
focus on the mutations of the movement, the paradox of resilience and failure, how the movement 
maintaining its power quietly and expanding its footprint in Syria and Yemen, and take advantages 
of the possible fall of ISIS, as well as Al-Qaeda’s status as an organization, network and idea 
(Mohamedou, 2011; Celso, 2014; Zelin et al., 2017; Hoffman, 2016). Other studies focus on the 
evolution of the Al-Qaeda franchise in new geographic and virtual spaces, implications for the 
national security of the United States, and the third decade of armed struggle between believers 
and people infidels that last for centuries (Atwan, 2012; Rollins, 2011; Jenkins, 2012). None of the 
previous studies focused on how the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda movement after Bin Laden’s 
death and the rise of ISIS. This article starts with the historical development and formation of the 
Al-Qaeda network in the world, followed by an analysis of the influence of Bin Laden’s death and 
the rise of ISIS towards the new orientation of the Al-Qaeda movement. 
As a movement, Al-Qaeda is the opposite of ISIS, declared by Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi. 
When ISIS was founded and then followed by attacks by U.S. coalition forces, Al-Qaeda did not 
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help them, even though they have the same intentions in campaign jihad to the Muslim in the global 
world. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
This paper describes from a literature review of various references from books, magazines, 
journals, and reports relating to the Al-Qaeda movement, terrorism, as well as the Middle East 
dynamics. Multiple researchers (such as Mohamedou, 2011; Celso, 2014; Zelin et al., 2017; 
Hoffman, 2016; Atwan, 2012; Rollins, 2011; and Jenkins, 2012) have widely written about these 
topics; still, the gap in the discussion is how the Al-Qaeda movement will look like after two 
significant events, the death of Osama Bin Laden and the rise of ISIS. This comparative study is 
an essential part of qualitative research to explain the phenomenon of the Al-Qaeda movement 
from several sources as well as the most up-to-date references from several analyzes and terrorism 
experts. These writings help the reader to get a clear picture of the strategy of Al-Qaeda after the 
two events. The authors realize that a more comprehensive analysis needs long and more in-depth 
research. However, a comparative literature study is the most rational choice to explain this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
Discussions Al-Qaeda’s new orientation after the death of Osama Bin Laden on one side and the 
rise of ISIS on the other side will explain from the history and the network of Al-Qaeda and the 
impact of the death of Bin Laden to the strategy and existence of the organization. The choice of 
the orientation of the Al-Qaeda determines by various internal and external dynamics that occur 
against them. After 9/11, the Al-Qaeda movement did not stop to engage each other and creating a 
new network even though the U.S. forces attack them. 
 
1. Al-Qaeda’s History and Network 
 
Al-Qaeda is an international resistance movement against the United States and the West, which 
was founded by Osama Bin Laden in 1988. This movement began in 1979 during the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan. In 1979, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan, a member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Abdullah Azzam, created an office called ”service office” (Maktab Al-
Khidmat) as a recruiting platform for Muslims who wanted to join the jihad in Afghanistan 
(Williams, 2002). Furthermore, according to Whittaker (2003: 42), in 1988, the office was later 
transformed into ”a terrorist group” known as Al-Qaeda. 
In the establishment of Al-Qaeda, Hussein (2008: 209) writes that this movement begun 
due to the absence of accurate data regarding the mujahidin who waged jihad in Afghanistan, while 
many of the Muslim families asked the fate of their family members. The idea of data collection 
eventually expanded into an independent office. As the use of the word Al-Qaeda continues, the 
United States finally gets the impression that the name is as an organization or network. Osama 
also showed a keen interest in the other hemisphere, Southeast Asia. Conboy (2008) writes that in 
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1998, Bin Laden sent his brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, to the Philippines to establish 
a rattan export company in Manila, which was also accompanied by a series of charitable and 
educational organizations funded by Bin Laden. 
According to Mir Zohair Husain (2003: 255) in the Global Islamic Politics, the location of 
Afghanistan as a jihad place has strategic importance. The country is known as the ”land of 
mullahs,” is geographically bordered by six other countries: China, Pakistan, Iran, and three states 
of the former Soviet Union (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The history of this country 
proves that the area is a commercial route that is important for the region. As a commercial route, 
it certainly brings its blessings and lures other states to get it. Ten years of conflict in the area (from 
1979 to 1989) brought together Islamic extremists and gained training experience in war. The 
Communist government in Afghanistan came to power in 1978 but failed to maintain control of its 
territory. At the end of 1979, the Soviet government sent its military units to ensure that 
Afghanistan was safe under Moscow's influence. When the resistance movement of the mujahidin 
occurred, according to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 72), ”this war resulted in defeat for the 
Soviet forces.” 
Efforts to accommodate the mujahidin and as a database, the Bait Al-Ansar and Maktab Al-
Khidmat (the Service Bureau) was lead by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden (Wright, 2006: 
119). The transformation from the service bureau into Al-Qaeda has vast implications for the 
Western countries as well as a democratic state which not applying the Islamic rule of law. 
According to Marc Sageman, Marlena Telvick said that Al-Qaeda has developed from an 
operational organization into a more significant social movement, and has implications for the war 
on terror from the United States. Sageman’s research on the four hundred terrorists who attacked 
the West and opposition to the government in his country said that Al-Qaeda had become a global 
jihad movement — not bound by geographical and geopolitical barriers.  
Al-Qaeda has vas networking from the Arab, Africa, Western Europe until Southeast Asia. 
Followers of global jihad can be called nodes (influential people) who are connected by links 
(network connectors). Every relationship that has more links in the network is called a hub (center 
of activity). Al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, is a global jihad movement that has since 1998 
issued fatwas on killing Americans and Jews in every place and period. 
According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), groups of people who has a connection 
with one another also form a network cluster. Al-Qaeda’s global network consists of four clusters 
made around nodes. Estimates about the number of nodes in the system are uncertain. Data released 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates that around 110,000 people have been trained 
in Al-Qaeda camps between 1989 and October 2001. There were about 20,000 have graduated 
between 1996 and 2001. Quoting Hendropriyono (2009: 199), Director Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Robert Muller in his explanation in February 2003 before the American 
Congress stated that hundreds of those who are nodes related to Al-Qaeda live and operate in the 
U.S. 
A.M. Hendropriyono (2009) states that in the body of Al-Qaeda consists of four clusters. 
The first cluster acts as the inner core or the central staff who live on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border. This axis consists of the highest leader (Amir Al-’Am), the leader of Al-Qaeda (Al-Amir Al-
Qaeda), the Shura Council of Al-Qaeda, and four commissions (the military commission, finance, 
fatwa, and information). Al-Qaeda’s top leader was Osama Bin Laden and the second row consists 
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of Abu Ayyub Al-Iraqi, Abu Ubaida Al-Panjshiri (Ali Rashidi), Abu Faraj Al-Yamani, Ayman Al-
Zawahiri, Fadel Al-Misri, Abu Burhan Al-Kabir, Abu Hafez (Muhammad Atef), Abu Mush’ab As-
Su’udi, and Izzuddin As-Su'udi. 
The Shura Council is Al-Qaeda’s highest institution with 31 core figures. This institution 
functions to provide consideration, opinions, and advice to Amir Al-’Am Osama Bin Laden. The 
thirty-one members, in addition to Bin Laden and the names of Al-Qaeda's top officials, include 
Abu Ibrahim Al-Iraqi, Abu Fadel Al-Makki, Sayyid Al-Misri, Qari Said Al-Jazairi, Khalifah 
Masqat Al-Omani, Saiful Al-Liby, and Abu Muhammad As-Su'udi. Under the Shuro Assembly, 
there are several committees. The Military Committee led by Abu Ubaidah Al-Panjshiri until he 
died drowning in Lake Victoria (Tanzania) in 1996, then it was continue led by Abu Hafez, who 
subsequently was hit by an American fighter in Kandahar. At present, this committee leading by 
former Egyptian colonel Saiful Adel. The Military Commission is responsible for conducting 
recruiting (rejuvenation), training, and carrying out terrorist operations. The Military Commission 
has built and held exercises in more than forty military camps spread across Afghanistan and 
several other countries such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Indonesia, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Yemen. For the Indonesian context, military training has a location in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Poso 
conflict occurs between Muslims and Christians. In 2000 under the supervision of Al-Qaeda cadres 
from Spain named Omar Bandon and Jusuf Galan, the exercise was carried out. His second trip 
from Madrid to Poso via Bali has guidance from an Al-Qaeda link named Parlindungan Siregar by 
managing funds, which were only about 50 million U.S. dollars before 9/11. 
Also, Al-Qaeda has a Financial Committee headed by Abu Fadel Al-Makki and Abu 
Hamam As-Su’udi. The commission has the power to circulate their money circulation into the 
network across the globe. By relying on an informal banking system called hawala, funds have 
been transferred through administrative boundaries and without the knowledge of the national 
governments. The Al-Qaeda Fatwa Committee is chaired collectively by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, 
Fadel Al-Misiri, Abu Faraj Al-Yamani, Abu Qatada, and Abu Hajar. The Fatwa Commission deals 
with the postulates of Islam to compile political praxis. The leader of the Information Committee 
or media is headed by Abu Mush'ab, nicknamed Abu Reuters (taking from name Reuters news 
agency). This task is to share information to the world. 
The leaders and core members of Al-Qaeda come from two militant Islamic factions from 
Egypt, namely Al-Jihad led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Jama’ah Islamiyah led by visually inspired 
cleric Umar Abdurrahman. Al-Qaeda is said to have institutional relations, with no organizational 
ties to other institutions in more than 50 countries, including Britain, Germany, Canada, the United 
States, Albania, and Tanzania (Fachry, 2008: 56-58). This assumption can be seen at least from 
Robin Wright (in Husain, 2003: 282), who said that Bin Laden established recruitment centers in 
more than 50 countries to find volunteers to wage jihad. The recruitment centers of the volunteers 
could be a forerunner to cooperation with Al-Qaeda because they previously had the same vision 
in dealing with the Soviet invasion. 
According to Hendropriyono, a central staff structure that has the characteristics of such a 
military organization makes the organization more flexible to maneuver (to move quickly). At the 
Military Commission, it has relations with four other clusters in various regions, including with 
organizations outside Al-Qaeda. The relationship task is to provide technical assistance, such as 
military exercises conducted by Al-Qaeda for Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 
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2000. The destruction of the clandestine (underground or secret) organization of the Jama’ah 
Islamiyah in Indonesia blurred relations. The blur was evident from the sharp explosion of a 
grenade made by Pindad on February 5, 2008, in a garage on Jalan Gatot Subroto, Jakarta. The 
second explosion that occurred on 15 February 2008 at the fork in the Keboiwo road, Denpasar, 
Bali, was not indicated at all with Al-Qaeda. 
The second cluster in the Al-Qaeda movement is the position occupied by Al-Qaeda 
members in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait. In the book The 
Secret History of Al-Qa'ida, Abdel Bari Atwan explains that since May 2003, al-Qaeda has opened 
its new branch in the Arabian Peninsula. They struggle to criticize the government of Saudi Arabia. 
There are at least two groups who want change in Arabia, namely the liberal opposition, which is 
an education graduate from campuses in America and Europe, and a jihadist group that demands 
change with weapons. In addition to concentrating on domestic issues, Al-Qaeda in Arabia also 
continues to target foreign targets (Fachry, 2008: 215). The Arab cluster has a closed connection 
to other militant groups such as Al-Tawhid in Egypt and Al-Jihad (the Egyptian Islamic Jihad), 
who joined Al-Qaeda ahead of 9/11. Al-Jihad is led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri. According to the 
Center for Defense Information (CDI), the first success of the Al-Jihad movement was in 1981 by 
assassinating Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. This group has been active since the 1970s, as one 
of the progress within the Muslim Brotherhood. In the 1980s, the Egyptian authorities acted 
violently by imprisoning their members. In the end, because of the pressure that came, this 
movement broke into two led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abbud Al-Zumar. Aside from Al-Jihad, 
joining this cluster are also some organizations in Yemen. 
The third cluster is the Maghreb Arabs Cluster or known as Tandzim Al-Qaeda Bilad Al-
Magrib Al-Islami (Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghrib States) or Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The Maghrib region includes countries such as Morocco, Algeria, 
Libya, and Tunisia. Initially, this movement stood alone. Still, on September 13, 2006, a movement 
called Jama'ah As-Salafiyyah li Ad-Da'wah wa Al-Qital or in French was called ”Groupe Salafiste 
pour la Predication et le Combat” (GSPC) (Salafi Da'wah Movement and Jihad) under the 
leadership of Abu Musaab Abdul Wadud joined al-Qaeda. It can be said that this movement is a 
splinter faction of the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which is simultaneously 
involved in efforts to overthrow the secular government of Algeria. The GSPC broke away from 
the GIA in 1996. In 1998, this movement vowed to end attacks on civilians. The reason for the 
GSPC merger was because ”the kuffar have united in destroying Islam, for that the mujahidin must 
unite to face the demons who have united.” This movement has links with the Moroccan Salafia 
Jihad (MSJ), and the Former Group Islamique Arme (Hendropriyono, 2009: 202, Fachry, 2008: 
219-221). Some MSJ leaders released by the Global Jihad website on May 29, 2009, were: Hassan 
Kettani, Abdelwaheb Rafiki, known as Abu Hafsh, Omar Haddouchi, Abdelhaq Moulsabbat, and 
Muhsin Khaibar. Whereas the Former Group Islamique Arme (Armed Islamic Group/Arabic Al-
Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah Al-Musallaha), according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
website, is a movement that opposed the secular military regime in Algeria in the 1990s. 
In the fourth cluster, namely the Southeast Asian region consisting of Jama’ah Islamiyah 
(J.I.) and its cells in Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia. According to Rohan 
Gunaratna in Inside Al-Qaeda, “Al-Qaeda has expanded its influence in Southeast Asia by utilizing 
the internet, infiltrating Muslim non-governmental organizations, sending extreme religious 
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leaders to the region and training activists in Afghanistan.” He further said that Al-Qaeda’s 
involvement in Southeast Asia included providing funds and military training for several militant 
Islamic groups in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines and planned to deepen its influence in 
the Southeast Asian region of approximately 210 million Muslims (Nainggolan et al. 2002: 140-
141). Included in this fourth cluster are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front movement, the Moro 
National Liberation Front, and Abu Sayyaf guerrillas in the Philippines. Unlike the characteristics 
of the inner relationship, the relationship between the inner circle and the other three clusters is 
tenuous and adopts a decentralized system.  
The movements carried out by Al-Qaeda in groups other than the core axis can be carried 
out without the knowledge of central Al-Qaeda, because the system is decentralized. What is 
essential in this collaboration is that a common goal to fight America. Continuing the picture of the 
four clusters, according to Hendropriyono, the organizational structure of Al-Qaeda as a whole is 
different from other terrorist movements in the past. Its characteristics change, and its shape is 
horizontal, does not follow the hierarchy of military organizations, is more streamlined, more 
linear, and is more organizationally networked than other groups. Authority in this group is very 
vital because it's dynamic and more goal-oriented than rule-oriented (Hendropriyono, 2009: 199-
204). Another advantage of the Al-Qaeda movement is that each node can connect with other nodes 
through countless paths, with obstacles that are difficult for others to enter and exit this flexible 
network. With so many trails, this movement has more of a long “breath” for action. If one lane is 
cut off, the other path is still safe and does not rule out the possibility of opening a new road again. 
How does Al-Qaeda influence in Southeast Asia? A.M. Hendropriyono (2009) writes that 
one of Al-Qaeda’s four clusters is in the Jama’ah Islamiyah (J.I.) in Southeast Asia, which was first 
led by Abdullah Sungkar. Although there is no organizational command relationship, movements 
in Southeast Asia, like J.I., have a shared vision with Al-Qaeda. Hijazi (2009: 85), wrote that “Al-
Qaeda as an organization, stands at the level: active cells and sleep cells spread in various countries 
in the world, Islamic groups accused of wasting to Al-Qaeda and has thought and organizational 
ties with Al-Qaeda. Although it is difficult to detect groups like this, we can see some of these 
groups, such as the Qoidah al-Jihadist organization Bilad Al-Rafidain (Tandzim Al-Qaeda Iraq), 
Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.) in Indonesia (where one of the members in the Bali Bombing I).” 
Rohan Gunaratna (2009) mentions that the Al-Qaeda movement has expanded its influence 
in Southeast Asia by utilizing the internet, infiltration of Muslim non-governmental organizations, 
sending extreme religious leaders, and training people in Afghanistan. No less than 210 million 
Muslims inhabit the Southeast Asian region. In such conditions, many predict that Southeast Asia 
can become fertile ground for the development of Al-Qaeda and a safe hiding place for its members 
who are the target of the U.S. government. The existence of this movement began to be sued and 
questioned when various bomb blasts occurred in ASEAN countries. People are suspicious of Al-
Qaeda and its network when a devastating explosion that killed 185 people occurred on Kuta Beach 
in Bali on October 12, 2002. A few days later, there was also a bomb explosion in Zamboanga 
(Philippines), which killed three people. 
Information about Al-Qaeda and its groups in Southeast Asia began after the Taliban 
Government in Afghanistan suffered defeat. The Singapore Intelligence Service received 
information that the Northern Alliance had captured Taliban troops from Southeast Asia. From this 
information, Singapore arrested 15 members of the Jama’ah Islamiyah in December 2001 on 
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charges of planning a bombing of U.S. and other Western targets in Singapore. Wangke writes, 
“This group is strongly suspected of having links to Al-Qaeda because they were confiscated with 
photos, bombs, video footage of the target of the attack, fake passports, fake immigration stamps, 
and some documents which related to Al-Qaeda. The Singaporean government says some of them 
have gone to Afghanistan to undergo military training in Al-Qaeda’s military camp” (see 
Nainggolan et al., 2002). The number of those detained increased again when, in August 2002, the 
Singaporean government arrested 21 suspected terrorists. Nineteen of the suspects were members 
or had been members of the Jama’ah Islamiyah, while the other two had links to the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front. With this arrest, the Singapore Government has arrested 34 terrorist suspects 
without going through court proceedings thanks to the homeland security act. Also, they seize 
ransom from the police so that it can be exchanged for captured jihadists and ransom catches from 
foreign tourists, especially those from the United States, Thailand, or their allies to be exchanged 
for captive Mujahidin in Indonesia. Also, they began to regularly attack Indonesian police or 
soldiers so that they would free the mujahidin who spend their time as a prisoner. The statement of 
attitudes in the name of the Al-Qaeda Tandzim in Southeast Asia written in the name of Abu 
Ubaidah, “Muhajir and Mujahid Pattani Darussalam Accredited to the End of the Al-Qaeda 
Tandzim of Southeast Asia.” 
From the above explanation, it can we can conclude that Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia did 
not appear formally (even today, 2019). Indications of the bombings that occurred in this region 
along with signs that the action was carried out by Al-Qaeda and those who were in the same vision 
showed that Al-Qaeda in this region did not appear openly, but was in the form of a formless 
organization (Sahrasad, Syukur, Al Chaidar, Tabrany, and Ridwan, 2019) or clandestine. Because 
this type of organization is secret, members keep the organization secret and do not show it 
publicly. Al-Qaeda in this matter exists, but because it is confidential, so it is not exposed to the 
public. Jama'ah Islamiyah, which one of the Al-Qaeda networks, is not structurally under Al-
Qaeda, because there has not been an official statement from the central Al-Qaeda that J.I. is a 
branch of Al-Qaeda. The Al-Qaeda movement in Southeast Asia is engaged in networks, not in the 
name of Al-Qaeda. Individually, Afghan alumni who returned to their territory in Southeast Asia 
shared the same vision of struggle with Al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden. However, organizational or 
structural command, strong evidence has not yet been found that there have been Al-Qaeda Tanzim 
(with the name “Al-Qaeda”) in Southeast Asia. 
How is Al-Qaeda in Indonesia? In the International Herald Tribune news headline entitled 
“Southeast Asia Bars Help of U.S. Troops” (December 14, 2001), Hendropriyono said that Al-
Qaeda had collaborated with radical groups in Poso in the case of a dispute between Muslim and 
Christian groups. The conflict took several years and involved Muslims outside Poso, including 
those from Afghan jihadi veterans. The influx of Al-Qaeda’s influence can be observed from the 
existence of the Jama’ah Islamiyah network (the fourth cluster of Al-Qaeda) operating in Poso. 
Operations carried out in this area are mostly the call of jihad to help oppressed Muslims in a place. 
The Observer News, Sunday, November 20, 2005, wrote, “For jihadists throughout the archipelago 
and beyond, the tension in Poso calls for the fight against 200,000 Christians. In the summer of 
2001, with little effort by the government to stop their migration, thousands of militants, mainly 
from banned groups such as Laskar Jihad (L.J.) and Jama’ah Islamiyah (J.I.), had traveled here 
with weapons, conducting military training from Afghanistan and the mission to expel the 
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infidels).” In responding to that fact, the Indonesian government took a cautious stance because 
there was no clear fact that Al-Qaeda was active in Indonesia. One of the reasons for this caution 
is that Indonesia is a safe area, not a war zone like in Palestine or Afghanistan. 
Indeed, after months of the government insisting that Al-Qaeda is not operating in 
Indonesia, it finally supported a public statement in December in which intelligence services 
recognized the existence of Al-Qaeda training camps in Indonesia. Foreign Minister Hassan 
Wirajuda once denied having evidence that local Muslim organizations have links to international 
terrorist networks. But one month later, Indonesia signed an agreement with Australia to fight 
international terrorism. Until the 2002 Bali Bombing, Indonesian officials such as Vice President 
Hamzah Haz began to trust the signal, even Defense Minister Matori Abdul Jalil said the Bali 
Bombers were carried out by Al-Qaeda with the help of Indonesians. Abdurrahman Wahid boldly 
mentioned that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), Habib Rizieq Shihab (Front 
Pembela Islam), and Ja’far Umar Thalib (Laskar Jihad) as “a local terrorists” because they always 
used violence and carried weapons everywhere (liputan6.com, October 1, 2002). Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir and Ja’far Umar Talib have a connection to Al-Qaeda, but Ba’asyir was closer than Talib. 
Ba'asyir was allegedly the leader of the Jama'ah Islamiyah (J.I.) as one of Al-Qaeda's links. 
In late July 2002, Indonesia announced that five Al-Qaeda members planning to attack the 
U.S. Embassy. President Bush then sent a secret Delta Force team to Jakarta to increase security, 
but the incident did not occur. Three months later (October), a new bomb exploded in Bali on 
October 12, 2002 (Syukur, 2012). Jones (2009) saw the incident with three theories. First, the 
American embassy issued a warning to its citizens to avoid public places in Indonesia twelve hours 
before the explosion. The CIA chose an area frequented by Americans and supplied materials for 
bombs. From that incident, Al-Qaeda and Islamic radicals were accused. These was done as an 
effort to win support for the war on Iraq and offered to assist in the investigation as a way to 
infiltrate American troops into Indonesia so that America could finally build a new footing in 
Southeast Asia. The second theory, according to Jones, is common among Indonesians living in 
conflict areas. This theory shows that the Indonesian National Army (TNI) is the culprit. The TNI 
has tried since the fall of Soeharto to reaffirm its role in provoking the government with conflict 
and then came to establish order. Proponents of this theory state that in reality, the army supported 
the formation of Laskar Jihad (L.J.), or the involvement of special forces soldiers in the death of 
Papuan independence leader, Theys Eluay. The struggle between the army and police to control 
internal security has become increasingly bitter and violent in the past year. The third theory is Al-
Qaeda’s theory, but it has few supporters. This theory sees that the relentless U.S. pressure on the 
Indonesian government to act against Indonesian citizens associated with the Jama'ah Islamiyah 
illicit network has convinced many Indonesians that their security services are forced to accept 
U.S. versions of events. The information of Umar Al-Faruq, a man who arrested in West Java in 
June 2002, is indeed evidence that there are plans by the Al-Qaeda group to kill President 
Megawati. 
The day after the Bali Bombing (October 13, 2002), according to Soeripto, Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard accused Al-Qaeda of the attack. U.S. President, George Walker Bush, on 
the same day with Howard's statement, via CNN broadcast said that the pattern of bombings in 
Bali was similar to the model carried out by Middle Eastern terrorists. From Israel, the Zionist 
state’s Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), on that day, bravely addressed the Islamic militants 
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associated with Al-Qaeda as the perpetrators of the attack. Furthermore, Yael Shahar accused Abu 
Bakar Ba'asyir as the first party to be suspected of involvement. British media, the Guardian, on 
October 15, 2002, took the opinion of Rohan Gunaratna said that Indonesia is an area that quickly 
becomes a den of terrorists. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, long before the Bali Bomb, 
had accused Baasyir as a Muslim terrorist figure and as the leader of the Jama’ah Islamiyah. In 
May 2002, Lee also mentioned the existence of Al-Qaeda’s sleeping army in Indonesia. This 
accusation is further strengthened by news in Time magazine (December 17, 2002) by quoting the 
CIA who claimed that Umar Al-Faruq claimed that Al-Qaeda had twice tried to assassinate 
President Megawati Sukarnoputri (Syukur, 2012). 
Wangke writes that the dismantling of Al-Qaeda cells in Southeast Asia shows that Osama 
bin Laden cleverly changed the terrorism network system by no longer focusing on al-Qaeda as an 
organization, but spread as parasites in various separatist groups or residents throughout the world 
(Nainggolan et al.:143-144). The issue of terrorism campaigned by America, also to find new 
targets in the war on terror. The Guardian (October 10, 2001) mentions that the aim of Islamic 
groups in Southeast Asia that have links to Osama bin Laden. Three countries are called “terrorist 
dens”: Indonesia, the Philippine, and Malaysia. Indonesia, as a Muslim majority country, has 
become an easy target for terrorists. Jonathan Weisman wrote a report in the USA today that the 
Pentagon has scheduled a plan to send troops to Indonesia. The objective is to silence radical 
Islamic groups suspected of being an extension of the Al-Qaeda network and considered 
threatening American interests in Southeast Asia. Citing U.S. intelligence sources, USA Today 
writes that dozens of Al-Qaeda operators at the time roam freely in the region of 17,000 islands, 
have hundreds of millions of Muslims, and have 34,000 miles of coastline. Information about the 
existence of Al-Qaeda in Indonesia was obtained from the results of monitoring activities in and 
out of the Middle East waters, as well as monitoring activities around the borders of Pakistan and 
Iran. President Bush once mentioned Iraq, Yemen, and Indonesia as targets for the next operation 
after Afghanistan. When the Financial Review reporter on March 15, 2002, asked him if Indonesia 
was hesitant—like Somalia—in dealing with terrorism, what would America do? Bush replied, 
“We will take action to protect the safety of citizens and the U.S. national interest. We will not 
hesitate to do it.” 
According to the author, to date, there has been no clarity in the al-Qaeda network in 
Southeast Asia. However, coordinatively, the possibility that this movement exists (in the form of 
an underground organization, clandestine) shows indications in that direction. It shows a 
connection to Bin Laden’s fatwa on the killing of Americans and Jews (civil and military) wherever 
they are. Jones (2009), wrote that it was never clear whether Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia existed. 
Even if there is a relationship with Noordin, one possibility is that the Abu Ubaidah group borrowed 
the name Al-Qaeda only because it agreed with Osama’s ideology, not because they were under 
the authority of the central Al-Qaeda leadership. Although it could happen, there is not a single 
point of evidence that Noordin and some other Southeast Asians have taken allegiance to Al-Qaeda 
members. 
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2. The Impact of Bin Laden's Death and the Rise of ISIS 
 
Osama Bin Laden’s death affected the existence of the Al-Qaeda movement. As a philanthropist 
who issued his finances to the Mujahidin and was involved in the war against Russia, Bin Laden 
has high charisma. At least, his charisma is seen from the point of being both generous and 
mujahidin. These two things later strengthened the Afghan war veterans to join the caravan of the 
Al-Qaeda. Without charisma, it is difficult for the ex-Afghan war to join. However, after Bin Laden 
died in Abottabad, Pakistan, the situation changed. Although Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s 
right-hand man who once led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Jamaah, has replaced Bin Laden, his 
charisma is different from Bin Laden’s. During Ayman's leadership, he didn’t do many big 
maneuvers, like Bin Laden. Ayman maintained the spirit of Al-Qaeda’s resistance to the West but 
did not appear to be progressive. However, in underground Ayman continued to make unreadable 
movements, primarily when ISIS was being targeted by U.S. and coalition forces. Al-Qaeda chose 
to move underground again and did not show any meaningful action. 
So, what did Al Qaeda do after these two incidents? First, the consolidation of the 
movement. Colin P. Clarke and Charles Lister (2019) wrote that after 9/11 and the death of Bin 
Laden, the Al-Qaeda movement is weak, and the leadership was continued to Ayman Al-Zawahiri 
and Hamza Bin Laden. Ayman is said to be in poor health, does not use communication equipment, 
and is in an isolated place in Pakistan. Meanwhile, Hamza Bin Laden, Osama Bin Laden's son, is 
said to have died. Since its appearance in August 2015, Hamza was rumored to be a “young lion,” 
a figure who would take over the leadership of Al-Qaeda from Ayman (Lister, 2019). Since ISIS 
established in 2014, Al-Qaeda has been consolidating by secretly moving the gravity of the 
movement from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Syria. This shift in the center of gravity is part of the 
way “to capitalize on the civil war in Syria.” (Clarke and Lister, 2019) 
After the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaeda did look more calm, quiet, and made smooth movements. 
They did not take a significant action because it very needs for consolidation. However, the vision 
of the movement to attack the West remained in their campaign. That is, although the movement 
seemed calm, especially after ISIS took control of Iraq and Syria, they still maintained the same 
vision when Osama Bin Laden was still there, namely attacking Western interests. 
Generally, many experts see that the shift of the Al-Qaeda movement from its aggressive 
to silent forms are based on limited local strategic objectives. They did not strengthen their global 
network, but instead increased their base in Syria. Al-Qaeda chose localism in that position. Clark 
and Lister (2019) called “controlled pragmatism” and “strategic patience.” the controlled 
pragmatism is intended by Al-Qaeda as a movement that does not have to be large and global, but 
focuses on a particular place that is considered strategic for the basis of the jihad action. Meanwhile, 
strategic patience is understood as “a silent movement” in the midst of the intense U.S. campaign 
and coalition forces to destroy ISIS. Al-Qaeda, as a counter-ISIS movement chose to let ISIS bear 
the enormous burden of the counter-terrorism movement from the West, while secretly carrying 
out internal consolidation. 
What forms of controlled pragmatism and strategic patience? In Syria, Al-Qaeda 
established the Al-Nusra Front, which the counterextremism.com website calls “Al-Qaeda 
affiliated organizations, Islamists, jihadists, Qutbists, Salafists, and Sunnis”, focusing on 
channeling the energy of the movement locally, prohibiting the law criminal, building alliances 
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across the Islamic and non-Islamic spectrum (besides ISIS), and participating from the possibility 
of building effective governance. The Al-Nusra Front gained a strategic place in Syria. Still, the 
effect then was that they became “very independent” and naturally became distant from the central 
Al-Qaeda leadership in South Asia. The decisions taken by Al-Nusra are more strategic and fast 
and do not consolidate with the center of the movement. This fact shows because of the distance 
that is not close, as well as the leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman Al-Zawahiri does not use communication 
tools and the need for rapid strategic decision making. 
In 2016, as its name continued to rise, the Al-Nusra Front then saw that there were obstacles 
when they were attached to Al-Qaeda. The name Al-Qaeda is very bad and people see like a 
suspicion, paranoia, and people tend not to believe so much. This is an obstacle for Al-Nusra to be 
trusted by various people. So, they then transformed in a new name, Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham or 
“Liberation Sham Front,” and later evolved again with the name Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham which 
means “Life of Liberation of Sham.” Both names remained oriented to locality (Sham, or Syria) 
and pretend to “free” Syria from various things that make the region not independent, one of which 
is ISIS. When Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham was announced to the public, they were ultimately not 
regarded as “a loyal member of the Al-Qaeda family,” which of course, was useful as a local 
strategy to win the hearts of many people. 
However, Hayat Tahrir was later crack again. A group of people saw that the Hayat 
movement was already impure, unclear, and had an “evolutionarily invalid” phase because, as an 
Al-Qaeda-based link, it was assumed that it should applying Al-Qaeda’s strategy. Those who 
separated then established Tanzim Huras Al-Din, which means religious guard organization, whose 
footing is based on the instructions of Al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. There is a kind of 
“longing” for the veterans to return to the Osama Bin Laden-style Al-Qaeda movement amidst the 
changing orientation of the locally-oriented Al-Qaeda leaders. This group does not focus on 
territorial control, but instead focuses on avoiding oneself from groups that are considered impure 
Al-Qaeda, and remains oriented towards attacks on “far enemies” (the West), and “near enemies” 
(local government/different local groups). 
When started at the end of 2017, the Tanzim Huras Al-Din group was led for the first time 
by Samir Hijazi or Abu Hammam Al-Shami, a military figure with extensive experience in Jordan, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, before he settled in Syria in 2012. Hijazi is a close figure 
with Al-Qaeda's military figure, Saiful Adel, and had previously worked with Abu Mush’ab Al-
Zarqawi in military training in Iraq. At present, writes Clarke and Lister (2019), Hijazi has been 
replaced by another figure, namely Khalid Al-Aruri or Abu Al-Qassam Al-Urduni, who is close to 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri. Aruri himself is one of the three central Al-Qaeda deputy leaders under 
Ayman, along with two al-Qaeda figures in Iran as house arrest, namely Saif al Adel and Abdullah 
Ahmed Abdullah or Abu Mohammad Al-Masri. Also, Aruri is known as one of the twelve members 
of the Al-Qaeda shura assembly. 
The internal evolution of the Al-Nusra Front then transformed into Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, 
Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, and Tanzim Huras Al-Din, explaining that internally the Al-Qaeda 
movement was inseparable from the internal rift (Hage Ali, 2018). The choice of the flag used as 
a movement becomes dialectics, which is not easy for internal Al-Qaeda. That is, three brands that 
were born in Syria in a period of only a few years explain the internal rift as well as the weakness 
of Al-Qaeda under Ayman. This could be due to the decreasing charisma of the leader of Al-Qaeda 
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from Osama Bin Laden to Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who looked softer than Bin Laden. Or, it also 
explains that the terrorism movement is not static movement, but dynamic and loaded with internal 
dialectics that separates and unites them at the same time. In the Indonesian context, for example, 
the birth of Jama’ah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) is inseparable from the internal dialectics that color 
the thoughts and movements of activists who are pro to the establishment of an Islamic state in 
extreme ways. In fact, within the body of JAD itself, there are many variations make it difficult for 
observers to map whether the acts of terror (amaliyah) from JAD or not. Dita Upriyanto (including 
his wife and four children), according to Kompas.com (May 25, 2018) the suicide bombers is a 
mentally ill, a frustation with life and do not understand Islam well, said Aman Abdurrahman, JAD 
leader. This fact shows that there are variations in thoughts and movements in JAD that are 
sometimes difficult to understand, including, in this case, the stabbing done by Abu Rara on 
Menkopolhukam Wiranto in Menes Square, Pandeglang, towards the end of President Joko 
Widodo's leadership (see Syukur, 2019).  
The second significant action by Al-Qaeda after the death of Bin Laden and the ISIS 
declaration is by not attacking the West despite the opportunities for that in Syria. Ayman Al-
Zawahiri, as Al-Qaeda's number one, had ordered the Al-Nusra Front not to attack the West in 
Syria. At that time, there was indeed a group called the Khorasan Group, a small group of Al-
Qaeda followers who were about to attack the West in Northern Syria. Ayman’s instructions are 
intended as part of Al-Qaeda's focus on locality and avoid Western scrutiny. That is, Al-Qaeda in 
Ayman's time chose to consolidate underground rather than act openly. 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri also reiterated the importance of Al-Qaeda's global struggle. Even 
though it is underground, their target to attack the West is maintained, or what Sajjan M. Gohel 
(2017) calls an attempt to keep the “international relevance, survival and sustainability” of the Al-
Qaeda movement. The single narrative that was built that “America is at war with Islam” is still 
maintained in Al-Qaeda as an offer of “a sense of identity” and meaning for the lives of its followers 
(Schmid, 2014), so that followers can continue to fight the West. For instance, according to Gohel 
(2017), Al-Zawahiri said that it's the time for them to focus on moving the war to the heart of the 
homes and cities of Western crusaders, and especially America. He also calling on followers to 
carry out single attacks such as attacks on behalf of Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) for 
the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015.  
This fact explains that Ayman still held bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa that allowed the attack on 
the civilian and military West. However, during poor and remote health conditions in Pakistan, it 
is seen that Al-Qaeda in Ayman’s time experienced various internal obstacles (dialectics, 
divisions), which made its movement weaker. Also, the presence of ISIS, which controlled a 
territory the size of England, made people who were pro armed struggle in the name of Islam prefer 
ISIS because they were no longer considered as a resistance group but had become a state. Those 
who join ISIS see that there is high progressivity from the ISIS which has controlled the area to 
establish the Islamic state rather than Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda just shows more as a resistance 
movement without progressivity in the establishment of the state. If seen from the vision of Al-
Qaeda, actually, they also want to establish an Islamic state, but it is different from the ISIS group. 
Osama Bin Laden also actually has stages of the vision of the Islamic Caliphate, but in his opinion, 
“it is too early” rather than something more important that is “provoking American anger” (Byman, 
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2019; Musharbash, 2008). At this point, there is a kind of competition between al-Qaeda and ISIS 
groups in the arena of global resistance against the West. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the above explanation related to the history and development of the Al-Qaeda network 
globally and the emergence of the ISIS movement that founded the Islamic State which was 
attacked by U.S. forces and coalitions, the authors conclude that after the death of Osama Bin 
Laden and the ISIS state’s declaration, Al-Qaeda chose to do a new strategy from global to local. 
This can be seen from the formation of the Al-Nusra Front in Syria, which became an “extension” 
of Al-Qaeda in the area of civil war conflict. However, what is dynamic here is the presence of 
dialectic movements with transformations that are not coordinated and cause divisions. The split 
was seen when the Al-Nusra Front was about to transform into Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham, Hayat Tahrir 
Al-Sham, and Tanzim Huras Al-Din. The transformation was seen as a strategy to gain influence 
at the local level but gave birth to internal divisions. 
Finally, this paper argues that the narrative of Al-Qaeda in the Ayman Al-Zawahiri era 
remained the same as in the time of Osama Bin Laden, namely the war between Islam and the 
West. Although his movements appear to be moving underground, Al-Qaeda still maintains the 
narrative of “war againts the west.” The effect then is that when ISIS has been failed (currently 
heading to that point), Al-Qaeda’s resistance to the West with this narrative may globalize again 
and then revive sleeping cells outside Syria and neighboring countries like Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. As explained above that supporter of Al-Qaeda are spread in various countries, which as 
“sleeping cells,” so they can rise again. Practically, all the world should to anticipate the potential 
attacks by Al-Qaeda followers in the world after the fall of Islamic State in Irak and Suriah.   
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